We consider one-to-one matching problems under two modalities of uncertainty that di¤er in the way types are assigned to agents. Individuals have preferences over the possible types of the agents from the opposite market side and initially know the 'name' but not the 'type' of the other players. Learning occurs via matching and using Bayes'rule. We introduce the notion of a stable and consistent outcome, and show how the interaction between blocking and learning behavior shapes the existence of paths to stability in each of the uncertainty environments. Existence of stable and consistent outcomes then follows as a side result.
Introduction
Since the seminal contribution of Gale and Shapley (1962) economists have predominantly analyzed centralized mechanisms to derive equilibrium outcomes in two-sided markets. The question whether such outcomes can be reached in a decentralized manner has taken a second stage although, one may argue, the decentralized markets outnumber those with a centralized mechanism in place. To the best of our knowledge the only authors to address this question are Roth and Vande Vate (1990) , Diamantoudi et al. (2004) , and Chen et al. (2011) . In all of these works, however, it is assumed that players on both sides of the market have complete information about the type of the agents on the other market side.
In the present paper we re-visit the question on whether an equilibrium outcome in the standard one-to-one two-sided market model can be reached in a decentralized manner when we assume away complete information. We discuss instead two worlds of uncertainty that di¤er in terms of the process that assigns types to market players. Here market participants have preferences over the types of the agents with whom they can be matched but not over their identities. In our analysis information requirements are kept to the minimum, that is, players only know their own type and type is independent of individual preferences. Thus, two agents of the same type may have di¤erent preferences. This constitutes also a crucial di¤erence between our work and Liu at al. (2012) , apart from the fact that we focus on the existence of paths leading to stable and consistent outcomes (consisting of a matching and a corresponding system of beliefs) in this framework.
More precisely, we show that when the number of types equals the number of agents and types are assigned as random independent draws from the set of types without replacement (one-to-one uncertainty), then any stable matching under complete information is part of a stable and consistent outcome of the corresponding matching problem with one-to-one uncertainty (Section 3.1). Consistency is shown in this case by the existence of a path containing a multiple of three steps of a particular form. On the other hand, when the number of types is at most equal to the number of corresponding agents and types are assigned to agents as random independent draws from the set of types with replacement (many-to-one uncertainty), we show that, starting from an arbitrary self-consistent outcome, there exists a path to a stable and consistent outcome for any matching problem with many-to-one uncertainty (Section 3.2). The construction of a path in this case is shaped by the interaction between blocking and learning behavior and uses, for some of its parts, Roth and Vande Vate's (1990) algorithm for reaching a stable matching in environments with complete information.
Setup
We consider two …nite sets M and W of agents, called "men"and "women", respectively. Agents can be of di¤erent types. We denote the …nite set of all possible male types by M and the …nite set of all possible female consisting of a matching function and a system of beliefs . The matching 
(2) m (w; t 1 ) > 0 and w (m; t 2 ) > 0.
Thus we require that each member of a blocking pair assigns positive probability to the fact that the other pair member is of a type ranked higher than the type of his or her current match. Note that the possibility of an agent blocking unilaterally the matching is also captured in the above formulation.
Certainly, the beliefs that an agent holds evolve with the search of an optimal partner, thus they cannot be just any believes but should be consistent with the individual agent's history. We call a system of beliefs consistent with respect to a matching (denoted by j ) if the following conditions are met:
for all w 2 W n f (m)g and all t 2 W .
(2) for all w 2 W with (w) 6 = ;, w ( (w); M ( (w))) = 1 and w ( (w);
for all m 2 M n f (w)g and all t 2 M .
(3) for all m 2 M with (m) = ;, m (w; t) = W (t) for all w 2 W and all
(4) for all w 2 W with (w) = ;, w (m; t) = M (t) for all m 2 M and all
Here the consistency of the system of beliefs with respect to a matching requires …rst, that each agent knows the type of his or her partner in this matching; and second, that agents'beliefs about the type of all other agents with whom they are not matched are updated using Bayes' rule. Notice in addition that agents staying single in the matching do not update their beliefs, i.e., their beliefs about the type of all agents on the opposite market side are given by the corresponding common priors. The outcome ; j is called self-consistent.
Next, we de…ne the consistency of an outcome with respect to a given history of matchings. We will consider an outcome ( ; ) to be consistent with respect to a self-consistent initial outcome ( 0 ; j 0 ) if there is a sequence of outcomes 1 ; j 1 ; : : : ; k ; j 1 ;:::; k with 1 ; j 1 = ( 0 ; j 0 ) and k ; j 1 ;:::; k = ( ; ) such that for all`= 1; : : : ; k 1 :
(1) there is a blocking pair (m`; w`) for `; j 1 ;:::; ` such that `+1 is obtained from `b y satisfying (m`; w`);
(2) there is a consistent Bayesian updating of beliefs j 1 ;:::; `+1 such that for all`= 1; : : : ; k 1 :
3) m`( w; t) j 1 ;:::; `+1 = P rob( W (w) = t j W (w`); j 1 ;:::; `) for all w 2 W n fw`g and all t 2 W , and w`( m; t) j 1 ;:::; `+1 = P rob( M (m) = t j M (m`); j 1 ;:::; `) for all m 2 M n fm`g and all t 2 M ; (2.4) m (w; t) j 1 ;:::; `+1 = m (w; t) j 1 ;:::; `f or all m 2 M nfm`g and all t 2 W , and w (m; t) j 1 ;:::; `+1 = w (m; t) j 1 ;:::; `f or all w 2 W n fw`g and all t 2 M .
Clearly, condition (1) above de…nes a 'legitimate' path of search for an optimal partner. We take an outcome to be consistent with respect to an initial self-consistent outcome if it can be derived from it by satisfying blocking pairs. Condition (2), on the other hand, describes a sound 'learning process', i.e., the updating of beliefs along the path of blocked matchings. We require here that all agents who are matched to each other know their true type; these agents use Bayesian updating to re-calculate the probability with which any other agent on the opposite side of the market is of any given type; and last, agents who do not participate in a blocking pair do not update their beliefs as they do not gain any additional information.
Using the above de…nitions, we can de…ne an outcome ( ; ) to be consistent if there exists an initial self-consistent outcome ( 0 ; j 0 ) with respect to which it is consistent. An outcome ( ; ) is stable if there are no blocking pairs for it. In what follows we will focus on outcomes which are both stable and consistent.
World of uncertainty
We will discuss two di¤erent mechanisms that map agents to types. In the …rst one learning the type of one agent will be informative about the probability with which all other agents on the opposite side of the market are of a particular type, while for the second mechanism this will not be the case.
Hence in the second case learning will be slower. In each of these cases we will discuss the relation between the set of stable and consistent outcomes under uncertainty and the set of stable outcomes under complete informa-tion. We will also ask the question whether there is a path reaching a stable and consistent outcome starting from any initial self-consistent outcome.
To answer the former question, we need to recall here the standard de…- 
One-to-one uncertainty
Consider a situation in which the number of male and female types equals the number of men and women, respectively, and types are assigned as random independent draws from the set of corresponding types without replacement, for all t 2 M is the prior probability that any man is of any given type.
Here knowing the type of one partner is informative about what types other potential partners may be, and more importantly, the probability with which other potential partners are ranked higher than the current one. Moreover, as agents are endowed with strict preferences over types, it implies that their corresponding preferences over potential partners are also strict. We will refer to this case as one-to-one uncertainty.
The existence of stable and consistent outcomes in this case is a direct corollary of our …rst result. with his partner in . By satisfying this blocking pair we can construct the consistent outcome ( 2 ; j ; 1 ; 2 ). This consistent outcome cannot be stable either as w forms a blocking pair ( (w); w) with her partner in , the reason being that is individually rational and preferences in both matching problems (with one-to-one uncertainty and with complete information) are strict. By satisfying this blocking pair we construct the consistent outcome
, where by construction 3 = and j ; 1 ; 2 ; 3 = j ; 1 .
Consider …nally the consistent outcome ( ; j ; 1 ; 2 ; ). The pair (m; w)
cannot block this matching because in the process of beliefs' updating m has learned the type of w and knows that he prefers to be with his partner in than to be with w. If there is no blocking pair, then this is a stable outcome and we have shown what we need. If there is a blocking pair, then this pair was also blocking the initial self-consistent outcome ( ; j ). Then, using the same logical steps as above, we can construct a path by satisfying the blocking pairs that will lead to a consistent outcome in a multiple of three steps that comprises of and a system of beliefs in which exactly four agents (two men and two women) use Bayes' rule to update their beliefs in a consistent manner. The process will continue in a multiple of three steps along the path until all agents who form blocking pairs in ( ; j ) have learned the type of their partners in the blocking pair. Since is stable under complete information, at least one of the partners in these blocking pairs will prefer her or his partner in to the one with whom they formed a blocking pair under one-to-one uncertainty. Thus, we can always go back to . Due to the …niteness of the sets M and W , this path will terminate in a …nite number of steps with a stable and consistent outcome that contains .
Given the existence result of Gale and Shapley (1962) for stable outcomes in the standard one-to-one matching problem, it is easy to establish the nonemptiness of the set of stable and consistent outcome under one-to-one type of uncertainty as a corollary of the above result.
Corollary 1
The set of stable and consistent outcomes for any matching problem under one-to-one uncertainty is non-empty.
Many-to-one uncertainty
Consider a situation in which the number of types is at most equal to the number of the corresponding agents (men and women), and types are assigned to agents as random independent draws from the set of types with replacement (i.e.,
Since the assignment functions M and W may not be one-toone or onto and thus, many agents can be assigned the same type, we have that agents'preferences over potential partners can contain indi¤erences even though their preferences over types are strict. We refer to this case as manyto-one uncertainty.
Here knowing the type of one partner is not informative about the types of the other agents on the opposite market side, and more importantly, the probability with which (the type of) the other potential partners are ranked higher than (the type of) the current one. Consequently, agents will continue 'learning' by blocking any matching in which they do not have complete information unless they are matched to an agent of their most preferred type. This observation will be in the core of the proof of our next result.
Theorem 2 Let a matching problem under many-to-one uncertainty be given and ( 0 ; j 0 ) be a self-consistent outcome of it. Then the matching problem has a stable outcome which is consistent with respect to ( 0 ; j 0 ). In this case we can construct a sequence of consistent outcomes ( 0 ; j 0 ), Thus, if there is no subsequent step r with L(r) 6 = ; (i.e., there are no possibilities for learning any more), we can adopt Roth and Vande Vate's (1990) algorithm to construct an increasing sequence of sets that contain no blocking pairs until a stable matching is found. This is possible because, as argued above, in any outcome in which all agents who form a blocking pair know each other's type, they must also know the type of any other agent on the opposite side of the market who forms a blocking pair; and they either know the type of the agents in the set A(r) with whom they do not form a blocking pair, or those agents in A(r) whose type they do not know are also in S(r) and thus they are matched to partners of their most preferred type. Since only blocking pairs with no learning are satis…ed along the path following k and reaching a stable matching, we construct a stable and consistent outcome that consists of the stable matching just obtained and the system of beliefs j 0 ; 1 ;:::; k .
An immediate corollary of Theorem 2 is the existence of a stable and consistent outcome in this set up.
Corollary 2 The set of stable and consistent outcomes for any matching problem under many-to-one uncertainty is non-empty.
It is also straightforward to show the following relation to the set of stable matchings in the corresponding complete information problem.
Proposition 1 Let a matching problem under many-to-one uncertainty be given and ( ; ) be a stable and consistent outcome of it. Then is stable for the corresponding matching problem with complete information.
The proof of Proposition 1 is analogous to the …rst part of the proof of Theorem 1.
Conclusion
In this work we embed the standard one-to-one matching problem in an environment of uncertainty. We show that with very little information requirements we can replicate standard results from the theory under complete information. Thus, one may argue assuming complete information in the …rst place has not been a limitation. On the other hand, developing a methodology for the analysis of two-sided matching problems under uncertainty opens the door for further investigation into the role of memory, speed of learning, and appropriate institutions that could facilitate the search along a path to stability.
